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I. INTRODUCTION
[L]ibel law is slowly shifting to become more solicitous of the rights of
injured victims. Only by understanding the reasons for the pro-victim shift
can the bar help their media clients to conform to the law with negligible
self-censorship side effects.
-Justice Richard Neely'
Justice Neely's warning in Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., Inc.2
put newspapers and the legal community on notice that the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals has embraced a new vision of libel
law. The tangled state of national libel law often leaves the journalist
with the unanswerable question of whether or not to publish an article.
The inevitable time restraints of the newspaper business dictate that
quick decisions be made by an editor or publisher, who will in turn
look to the lawyers of West Virginia for guidance. The bar must there-
1. Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560, 574 (W. Va. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1384 (1993).
2. 423 S.E.2d at 574.
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fore be aware of any substantive or policy changes in libel law made
by Hinennan.
Initially, the most glaring impression of Hinerman is that the case
produced two adamant and controversial opinions. Justice Neely wrote
the majority opinion in favor of the plaintiff, Attorney Raymond
Hinerman.3 He commented on the "surpassing ego and unbridled igno-
rance" of the Gazette,4 "[t]he excesses of 'yellow journalism,"' 5 and
the "rediscovery that the popular media are in the entertainment
business far more than they are in the information business."'6 In turn,
the majority opinion evoked a blistering response from the dissent,
through Justice Miller. The dissent rejected the majority opinion as
"badly botched" and suggested that "[w]ere it not for judicial immuni-
ty. ... the Gazette would have a good libel suit against the majori-
ty.,
7
It is certain that this case is controversial. However, it remains to
be seen whether Hinennan represents a material change in law. The
purpose of this note is to review West Virginia's libel law in light of
the Hinerman decision and to provide guidance to newspapers and
their lawyers as to the current state of the law.
II. BACKGROUND OF LIBEL LAW IN WEST VIRGINIA
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis
something, nothing,
Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to
thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
3. Id. at 565.
4. Id. at 579 n.30.
5. Id. at 575 n.23 (citing Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890)).
6. Id. at 575 (citing NEIL POSTMAN, AMusING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DiS-
COURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW BusINEss (1985) (emphasis omitted).
7. Id. at 584-85 (Miller, J. dissenting).
[Vol. 96:471
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And makes me poor indeed.
Othello I, hi s
Man's desire to protect his good name is as ancient as man's
history itself. Biblical9 and literary references ° to the preservation of
reputation are plentiful. In modem times, the law of defamation has
become the method by which reputation is protected in the courts. The
West Virginia Constitution, while insuring the freedom of speech and
of the press, allows the Legislature to provide necessary penalties, in-
cluding damages, for libel and defamation of character." Furthermore,
in a civil libel suit, truth and good motives in publication will be an
absolute defense.1
2
A. West Virginia Media Law and Media Defendants
West Virginia libel law involving media defendants developed
under the common law principles of the tort of defamation.1 3 The
burden was originally on the defendant in a libel action to prove that
the allegedly libelous publication was, in fact, true in order to avoid
liability.14 Certain statements were considered libelous per se, such as
a false accusation of a crime." However, this strict liability for publi-
8. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 1.
9. See, e.g., Ecclesiastes 7:1 ("A good name is better than precious ointment[.]").
10. See, e.g., PUBLHJS SYRUS, maxim 108 ("A good reputation is more valuable than
money." (First Century B.C.)).
11. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7 states:
No law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall be passed; but the
legislature may by suitable penalties, restrain the publication or sale of obscene
books, papers, or pictures, and provide for the punishment of libel, and defamation
of character, and for the recovery, in civil actions, by the aggrieved party, of suit-
able damages for such libel, or defamation.
Id.
12. W. VA. CONST. art. m, § 8 states that "[i]n prosecutions and civil suits for libel,
the truth may be given in evidence; and if it shall appear to the jury, that the matter
charged as libelous, is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the verdict shall be for the defendant."
13. See, e.g., Bower v. Daily Gazette Co., 104 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1958) (malice
may be inferred from the words used to destroy qualified privilege).
14. See, e.g., Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel, 26 S.E.2d 209 (W. Va. 1943);
Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158 (1878).
15. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158 (1878); Milan v. Long, 88 S.E. 618,
3
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cation of such false statements was tempered by common law privi-
leges, developed to allow media defendants a defense to actions based
on allegedly defamatory statements.
Both absolute and qualified privileges were used in West Virginia
as defenses to alleged defamation, along with the defense of truth
itself. Absolute privilege is based on the policy that certain activities
require total freedom of expression without inquiry into the publisher's
motives. 16 An absolute privilege insulates a defendant from liability,
but is generally limited to (1) legislative, judicial, quasi-judicial, and
other acts of the state;17 (2) defamation consented to or caused by the
plaintiff;18 and (3) the broadcast of statements made by political can-
didates. 9 At one time, a citizen was afforded absolute immunity in
West Virginia when petitioning the government for redress.20 Howev-
er, the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
2 1
was recently held to apply to intentional and reckless falsehoods dur-
ing such petitioning, eliminating absolute privilege.22
Qualified privileges have been available to West Virginia defen-
dants as a defense to defamation, based on the theory that it is essen-
tial that information be disseminated in order to protect individual or
public interests, even though inaccuracies are, from time to time,
619 (W. Va. 1916); Colcord v. Gazette Pub. Co., 145 S.E. 751, 753 (W. Va. 1928) (any
publication falsely imputing a crime or moral delinquency is actionable per se, without
proof of special damages).
16. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 77 (citing W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 796 (1964)).
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Brown, 13 W. Va. 71 (1878); Higgins v. Williams
Pocahontas Coal Co., 138 S.E. 112 (W. Va. 1927).
18. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d at 78.
19. Id. See also, Ward v. Ward, 35 S.E. 873, 874 (W. Va. 1900) (absolute privilege
allows a judgment in favor of the defendant as a matter of law).
20. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d at 78.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See discussion infra part II.B.
22. Harris v. Adkins, No. 93-21537, 1993 WL 241437 (W. Va. filed June 28, 1993)
(the right to petition the government is not protected by an absolute privilege, but is viewed
by the actual malice standard); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981) (upholding an
absolute privilege to petition the government) overruled in part by Harris. See also Crump,
320 S.E.2d at 78; Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 328 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1985) (no comnon
law privilege protects intentional publication of false material).
[Vol. 96:471
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inevitable.23 Qualified privilege exists when a publisher makes a good
faith statement about a subject pursuant to a special interest or duty,
and the publication is limited to people who have a legitimate interest
in the subject.2 4 "Fair comment," protecting opinion, and "fair report,"
protecting accurate reporting, are the two commonly recognized quali-
fied privileges available to the press.25 These privileges, however,
were ineffectual in West Virginia if abused or exceeded.26 In 1943,
West Virginia became one of a minority of states which embraced the
qualified privilege for a media defendant who makes a good- faith,
reasonable misstatement about the duties of a public official.27 The
West Virginia Supreme Court acknowledged that, in order to protect
society's interest in governmental affairs, publishers acting in good
faith should be protected from strict liability for misstatement of
fact.28 In 1964, the national landmark libel case, New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan cited Bailey with approval, 29 bringing the common law
privilege of fair comment within the protection of constitutional law.3°
Different types of libel plaintiffs were recognized early in West
Virginia libel law,31 and standards have developed in accordance with
23. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 78 (citation omitted).
24. Swearingen, 26 S.E.2d at 215. See also Ward v. Ward, 35 S.E. 873, 876 (W. Va.
1900); Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 280 S.E.2d 216, 222 (W. Va. 1981); Stewart v.
Riley, 172 S.E. 791 (W. Va. 1934).
25. Robert D. Sack, Common Law Libel and the Press, in Communications Law 1992,
at part V (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series
No. 346, 1992). See, e.g., Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. at 158 (fair comment); Bailey v.
Charleston Mail Ass'n, 27 S.E.2d at 837 (fair comment); England v. Daily Gazette Co. 104
S.E.2d at 306 (fair comment); Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc. 211 S.E.2d 674, 691-
92 (W. Va. 1975) (fair reporting); Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E52d. 70, 75 (W. Va.
1981) (fair comment).
26. See, e.g., England, 104 S.E.2d at 311-12; Bower v. Daily Gazette Co., 104 S.E.2d
317, 319 (W. Va. 1958) (malice may be inferred by a jury where qualified privilege has
been abused or exceeded).
27. Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 27 S.E.2d 837, 844 (W. Va. 1943).
28. Id.
29. 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964).
30. See Kermit L. Hall, Justice Brennan and Cultural History: New York Times v.
Sullivan and Its Times, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 339, 340 (1991).
31. See Sweeney, 13 W. Va. at 183 (acknowledging the important public interest in
commenting on candidates for public office); Swearingen, 26 S.E.2d at 215 (explaining that
the public has an interest in the actions of a public officer).
5
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constitutional interpretation to differentiate between private and public
plaintiffs." "The essential elements for a successful defamation action
by a private individual are (1) defamatory statements; (2) a
nonprivileged communication to a third party; (3) falsity; (4) reference
to the plaintiff; (5) at least negligence on the part of the publisher;
and (6) resulting injury., 33 However, a public official or candidate for
public office must prove that:
(1) the alleged libelous statements were false or misleading; (2) the state-
ments tended to defame the plaintiff and reflect shame, contumely, and
disgrace upon him; (3) the statements were published with the knowledge
at the time of publication that they were false or misleading or were pub-
lished with a recklessness and willful disregard of truth; and (4) the pub-
lisher intended to injure the plaintiff through the knowing or reckless pub-
lication of the alleged libelous material'Y
This standard incorporates the constitutional "actual malice" standard
mandated by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan.5
32. See, e.g., Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 74 (concerning a private individual); Starr v.
Beckley Newspapers Corp., 201 S.E.2d 911, 911 (W. Va. 1974) (explaining that a municipal
police sergeant is a public official); Sprouse v. Clay Communications, 211 S.E.2d 674, 679
(W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 991 (1975) (stating that a
candidate for office is governed by the same standard as a public official); Dostert v.
Washington Post, Co., 531 F. Supp. 165 (D.W. Va. 1982) (stating that an elected judge is
a public official); Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1986) (explaining that publicly
elected officials are treated as public officials); Dixon v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc. 416
S.E.2d 237, 240 (W. Va. 1991) (explaining that police officers are public officials).
33. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 74; see also Rand v. Miller, 408 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va.
1991); Bryan v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1987);
Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1981); W. Martin Harrell, Havalunch v.
Mazza-The Scrambling of Constitutional and Common Law Defamation Analysis in West
Virginia, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 849 (1982) (arguing that the proper standard of fault for a
private individual should be actual malice rather than negligence).
34. Sprouse, 211 S.E.2d at 679. See also Long, 346 S.E.2d at 780; Dixon, 416 S.E.2d
at 238.
35. 376 U.S. at 280.
[Vol. 96:471
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B. West Virginia Libel Law After New York Times v. Sullivan
National libel law changed drastically after the New York Times
decision. That 1964 case involved a libel suit by Sullivan, a City
Commissioner who was responsible for the Montgomery, Alabama po-
lice department against defendants who published an advertisement
soliciting donations for the civil rights movement.36 Sullivan alleged
that falsities in the ad had defamed him.37 Justice Brennan held, how-
ever, that in order for a public official to recover damages for a de-
famatory falsehood relating to his official conduct, he must prove "that
the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."38 The case applied First Amendment theory to libel law39 and
provided constitutional protection to insure that no libel judgment in-
trudes on freedom of expression.40 In the following years, the Court
defined41 and extended42 the New York Times doctrine.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch Co. the United States Supreme Court
defined a new standard for awards in libel cases.4 3 Although at com-
mon law damages were available to libel plaintiffs irrespective of inju-
ry4 Gertz established that unless the New York Times standard of
"actual malice" is found, only a recovery for actual injury is al-
lowed.45 Following Gertz, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals decided that a jury may consider mental anguish, insult, indignity
36. Id. at 257-60.
37. Id. at 256.
38. Id. at 279-80.
39. Id. at 270-71.
40. Id. at 285.
41. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1967) (defining "reckless disre-
gard" narrowly).
42. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (applying the actual malice stan-
dard to a lower-level public official: a park supervisor); Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (applying actual malice to "public figures"--those who influence public dis-
cussion).
43. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (finding negligence the proper standard for private individu-
als).
44. Sack, supra note 30, at part VI.A.
45. 418 U.S. at 349.
7
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and humiliation in awarding actual damages in a libel action.46 Puni-
tive damages are likewise permissible, but only "in cases where the
award of actual damages is insufficient to dissuade others in like cir-
cumstances from committing similar acts in the future."47 In Sprouse,
Justice Neely found that a $500,000 punitive award was excessive in
light of the actual damage award of $250,000.48 The actual damage
award was deemed adequate to dissuade similar willful and reckless
conduct in the future, and allowing the punitive award to stand would
have had a chilling effect, leading to press self-censorship.49 Howev-
er, as the most recent case law suggests, punitive damages will be
awarded in West Virginia when common law malice exists in order to
deter malicious, as well as extremely negligent behavior which is like-
ly to cause harm.5 0
West Virginia has codified the common law principle that a re-
traction serves as evidence for mitigating punitive and compensatory
damages.51 Although New York Times stated that the failure to retract
does not necessarily indicate the presence of actual malice at the time
of initial publication, 2 some courts have followed the proposition that
a prompt retraction may be used as evidence that the misstatement was
46. Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975). The
Charleston Daily Mail used oversized headlines in articles, two weeks before the election
about gubernatorial candidate James Sprouse's real estate transactions. The headlines were
found to have a defamatory implication because they led the average reader to a different
conclusion than the facts given in the articles.
47. Id. at 692.
48. Id.
49. Id. Although the amount of punitive damages is within the province of the jury,
other courts have likewise adjusted libel awards. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co.,
745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that a $33 million punitive award shows an appeal
to passion or prejudice of the jury), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985). But see Newton v.
National Broadcasting Co., 677 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Nev. 1987) (explaining that in light of
defendant's net worth of $2 billion, the $5 million punitive award does not shock the
court's conscience), rev'd on other grounds, 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 192 (1991).
50. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887-88 (W.
Va. 1992) (affirming a $10,000,000 punitive and $19,000 compensatory award in a slander
of title action because the defendant had moved from the "really stupid" to the "really
mean" category), aft'd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
51. W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (1923).
52. 376 U.S. 254, 289 (1964).
8
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accidental, and may therefore help establish a lack of actual malice at
the time of publication. 3
In order to balance the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
the press with the individual's interest in not being defamed, New
York Times mandated independent review of the record of all public
figure or public official actual malice cases. 4 In Sprouse, the West
Virginia Supreme Court found it essential "both to consider the law
and to make an independent evaluation of the evidence to insure First
Amendment protection to publishers. 55 The nature of this review has
been refined, in light of Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of United
States, Inc.,56 to require that courts decide initially whether as a mat-
ter of law the challenged statements in a defamation action are capable
of a defamatory meaning.5 7 If the statements are capable of defama-
tory interpretation, the court is then required to review the evidence of
defendant's actual malice as it was presented by the public figure
plaintiff during the trial, in order to determine if the evidence will
support the verdict under a clear and convincing standard.58
Before New York Times, the West Virginia Supreme Court was
one of a minority of states which protected good faith defendants who
spoke out on the conduct of public officials.5 9 Throughout the years,
very few libel awards against media defendants have been sustained by
53. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd
without opinion, 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814
F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1987).
54. 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). Although it is agreed that an independent review of
whether actual malice existed at the time of publication is required, the courts are split on
whether the court is also required to conduct an independent review of the predicate issue
of falsity. See discussion infra part V.
55. 211 S.E.2d 674, 681 (W. Va. 1975); see also Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 280
S.E.2d 216, 217 (W. Va. 1981); Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1981);
Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1986); Dixon v. Ogden Newspapers, 416 S.E.2d
237 (W. Va. 1991).
56. 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984).
57. Long, 346 S.E.2d at 780; see also Dixon, 416 S.E.2d at 241.
58. See Dixon, 416 S.E.2d at 244-45 ("[A]fter reviewing both the transcripts of the
proceedings below and the contents of the two newspaper articles . . . , we conclude that
the plaintiffs did not present the clear and convincing evidence of actual malice that public
officials are required to show in order to sustain an action for libel.").
59. Bailey, 27 S.E.2d at 844.
9
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the West Virginia high court,60 and the court frequently reiterated its
commitment to the protection of the First Amendment freedom of the
press. 61 The question, then, is whether Hinerman v. Gazette represents
a change in that commitment.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The dispute in Hinerman v. Gazette involves the publication of an
editorial by the Charleston Gazette on May 20, 1983.62 However, the
case hinges on the events which occurred prior to the publication
concerning the plaintiff, Raymond Hinerman, a lawyer, and his former
client, Sam Levin.
Mr. Levin was a Russian immigrant who worked in Wheeling as a
coal miner until he had a heart attack. He then filed a Workers' Com-
pensation claim, availing himself of the services of the United Mine
Workers' free legal representative: Raymond Hinerman.63 Mr. Levin
protested the original 20 percent compensation award.64 During Mr.
Levin's appeal, Mr. Hinerman left the UMW, and the UMW hired a
new lawyer.65 Mr. Levin, however, retained Mr. Hinerman as private
counsel to pursue the appeal and Mr. Levin signed a standard contin-
60. See, e.g., Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 571 ($75,000 compensatory and $300,000 puni-
tive damages upheld); Sprouse, 211 S.E.2d at 680-81 (upholding $250,000 in actual damages
and striking $500,000 in punitive damages as excessive); Chambers v. Smith, 198 S.E.2d
806 (W. Va. 1973) (holding that a $7,000 award was not excessive in a libel suit brought
by a principal and vice principal of a high school against the county school board). But see
Average Jury Libel Award Rises to Nine Million Dollars, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992 at
14 (a study by the Libel Defense Resource Center says the average national libel award
from 1990-1991 was nine million dollars compared with $1.5 million from 1980 to 1989).
61. See, e.g., Sprouse, 211 S.E.2d at 689 (advocating "strong sympathy toward pro-
tection of the robust political discussion contemplated by the First Amendment"); Long, 176
S.E.2d at 784-86 (applying a stricter standard in appraising defamation actions by public
officials or public figures for motion to dismiss, in light of the public policy that "errone-
ous statement is inevitable in free debate . . . [and] must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive"' (quoting New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-272)).
62. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 565.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
[Vol. 96:471
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gent fee contract.66 The appeal was ultimately successful and Mr.
Levin was to receive nearly $20,000 in back benefits and a stipend of
$1,162 per month.67
A dispute as to Mr. Hinerman's fee ensued. Mr. Levin, who had
moved to Florida, revoked Workers' Compensation's authority to send
his benefit check to Mr. Hinerman, thus preventing the lawyer from
deducting his fee.68 Mr. Hinerman billed Mr. Levin, and eventually
filed suit in circuit court to collect the fee pursuant to the contract.69
Mr. Hinerman was given a default judgment against Mr. Levin which
was upheld against motions to vacate.70 Mr. Levin, through his new
attorney, Mr. Gold, then filed a petition with the West Virginia Su-
preme Court.7' The allegations in that petition became the subject of
the disputed Gazette editorial.72
The Gazette ran a news article on May 18, 1983 relating the
allegations set out by Mr. Gold in the petition.73 The article described
the fee dispute as well as Mr. Levin's claims that the fee was exces-
sive and that he had not understood the fee agreement because of his
limited English ability.74 Additionally, the article described Mr.
Levin's claim that he could not afford to hire a lawyer to represent
him in the suit brought by Mr. Hinerman, and that he had attempted
to file pro se, but that these attempts were rejected by the court be-
cause they "failed to comply with the rules."75 The article further
cited the petition stating that the judge ruled that "Hinerman could
66. Id. The contract called for Hinerman to receive twenty percent of Mr. Levin's
compensation for 208 weeks.
67. Id. at 565.
68. Id. at 566.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Ultimately, the court upheld the circuit court's default judgment, finding in favor
of Mr. Hinerman. The court did, however, allow Mr. Levin a $600.00 reduction based on
the fee paid to Hinerman by the UMW. Hinerman v. Levin, 310 S.E.2d 843 (W. Va.
1983).
72. Hinernan, 423 S.E.2d at 566.
73. Id. at 586 n.8 (Miller, J. dissenting). The news article is set out in its entirety in
Justice Miller's dissenting opinion.
74. Id.
75. Id.
11
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attach 100 percent of Levin's Workers' Compensation benefits until the
bill was paid[,]" and that "[t]he effect of this ruling is to give to the
plaintiff, a practicing attorney, all of the petitioner's income while the
petitioner, who is totally disabled, has no source of income whatso-
ever."
76
Two days later James Haught wrote and published an editorial in
the Gazette entitled "Lawyer Ethics" which again recited the allega-
tions as set out in Mr. Levin's petition and in the earlier Gazette arti-
cle.77  Subsequently, Mr. Haught and W.E. Chilton HI ,7 received
76. Id.
77. Id. at 566. The entire editorial reads:
LAWYER ETHICS
The State Bar ethics committee which guards against lawyer misconduct-and
also the Judicial Inquiry Commission which watches over judges-should keep an
eye on a current state Supreme Court case.
It involves a sick immigrant miner who won disability payment, but his lawyer
took every penny, getting $12,000 for one day's work. (The lawyer said the old
man was lucky because $1,000 of the miner's legal expense was billed to a differ-
ent client). A judge allowed it to happen because a letter from the immigrant
didn't meet proper legal form.
Allegations before the high court:
Sam Levin, a Russian native, moved to Wheeling and worked for Consolidation
Coal Co. until he suffered a heart attack. UMW attorney Ray Hinerman, paid by
the union, represented Levin free before the Workers' Compensation Fund. The
miner was granted 20 percent disability.
Hinerman quit the UMW and represented Levin privately in an appeal. After a
one-day hearing, Levin was granted 100 percent disability. Hinerman sent the ex-
miner a bill for $4,202. Levin didn't pay. The lawyer sued in Hancock County
Circuit Court, demanding $12,088.
Levin wrote a letter to Judge Callie Tsapis saying he couldn't afford to hire
another lawyer to answer the suit, but felt he owed Hinerman nothing. "I am
convinced that Mr. Hinerman used my ignorance and lack of skill in language and
law to his advantage." Ms. Tsapis ruled that the letter didn't constitute a legal
reply. She gave Hinerman a default judgment and allowed him to seize 100 per-
cent of Levin's Worker's Compensation benefits.
A different lawyer came to Levin's aid and appealed to the Supreme Court. The
petition says Hinerman, incredibly, testified that he did the old miner a favor by
billing $1,000 worth of Levin's expenses to another client.
The case hasn't been decided, but it implies that another helpless client has suf-
fered at the hands of a lawyer. The legal ethics committee should monitor the
case closely. Unfortunately, the committee usually won't act unless an official
complaint is filed in proper legal form-and then 'the committee focuses on tedious
technicalities rather than basic morality, right and wrong.
12
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several phone calls from Mr. Hinerman's associates challenging the
veracity of the editorial.7 9 Mr. Haught suggested that Mr. Hinerman
write a letter to the editor. Instead, Mr. Hinerman filed an expedited
brief in the Supreme Court.80 The Gazette took Another Look in an
editorial two weeks later, referring to the case as a "tangle of contra-
dictions., 81 This piece enumerated several of Mr. Iinerman's asser-
tions from the reply brief. Notably, the editorial said that the reply
attacked "'the deliberate distortion that the effect of the ruling by the
circuit court gave Raymond A. I-inerman 100 percent of Sam Levin's
Workers' Compensation benefits"' when Mr. Levin actually got
"$12,640 temporary total disability benefits, $20,895 lump sum benefits
and $1,162 a month for the rest of his life-a potential $350,000 to
$400,000, of which the attorney's share constitutes only 3 percent." 82
Mr. Hinerman subsequently brought this libel action against the
Gazette. A jury in Brooke County awarded Mr. Hinerman $75,000 in
actual damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.83
IV. THE COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court of West Virginia agreed to review the judg-
ment to evaluate if it was in accord with the freedom of the press and
First Amendment principles as set out in New York Times and its
As for Judge Tsapis, nothing she might do would be surprising. She once hosted
a party at which crooked lawyers under prison sentence or indictment were hailed
as heroes. The Judicial Inquiry Commission found nothing wrong with her conduct
then. Still, the commission should ask why she allowed a lawyer to take all the
public money granted to an impoverished ex-miner too sick to work.
Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 567. At the time the editorial was published, Mr. Chilton was the Publisher
of the Gazette.
79. Id. at 569-70. See also id. at 569-70 nn.5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16 (testimony of
Fred Risovich, II, William Fahey, and Michael Nogay recounting conversations with Mr.
Haught and Mr. Chilton).
80. Id. at 571. Hinerman and his associates were concerned that it would be unethical
to respond to the editorial in the form of a letter to the editor. On advice from Bar Coun-
sel, they opted to send an expedited brief. Id. at 571 n.16.
81. Id. The second editorial is reprinted in its entirety. See id. at 570.
82. Id. at 571.
83. Id. at 565.
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progeny. 4 The Court was divided three to two in affirming the jury
award. Justice Neely wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice
Workman and Senior Justice Caplan." Justice Miller, joined by Jus-
tice Brotherton,86 wrote the scathing dissent which accuses the majori-
ty writer of "unbridled ignorance '8' and invites United States Su-
preme Court review88 of this "badly botched" decision. 9 The two
high-spirited opinions reflect the difficulty which a court faces when
deciding a First Amendment libel case.
A. The Majority Opinion: A Pro-Victim Shift
Justice Neely observes a pro-victim shift in recent United States
Supreme Court First Amendment libel cases, which prompts him to
offer a clarification of the current state of the media's privileges and
obligations in West Virginia.90 In so doing, he states that the jury
was warranted in finding that Raymond Hinerman was libeled by the
Gazette editorial and that the award was appropriate. 9' In a six part
decision, Justice Neely reviews the case itself, and offers guidance to
lawyers in their quest to help "media clients to conform to the law
with negligible self-censorship side effects."'
Part one of the decision discusses the proper standard by which a
public official libel action should be evaluated.93 In order to recover
84. Id. at 571 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). See discus-
sion supra part II.B.
85. Defandant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court at
la, Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1384 (1993). Justice McHugh did not participate.
86. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 596.
87. Id. at 590 n.14.
88. Id. at 595.
89. Id. at 584.
90. Id. at 574.
91. Id. at 571.
92. Id. at 574.
93. Id. at 571-76. In part VI of the decision, however, Justice Neely determines that
Mr. Hinerman was not a public official according to United States Supreme Court standards.
See discussion infra part IV.A.
[Vol. 96:471
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for damages, a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evi-
dence94 that:
(1) there was the publication of a defamatory statement of fact or a state-
ment in the form of an opinion that implied the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion; (2) the stated or implied
facts were false; and, (3) the person who uttered the defamatory statement
either knew the statement was false or knew that he was publishing the
statement in reckless disregard of whether the statement was false.
95
Neely views the final requirement of showing a publisher's "subjective
appreciation" of falsity or recklessness, which is a restatement of the
actual malice standard, as the most difficult burden.96 The additional
New York Times requirement that the trial and appellate courts must
conduct an independent review of the facts establishing actual malice
adds to the plaintiff's burden.97
The opinion devotes substantial analysis to a shift in the United
States Supreme Court's libel decisions, which reflect "an ebbing toler-
ance for irresponsible media behavior." 98 In support of this proposi-
tion, Justice Neely first cites the fact that the Court has showed a
"waning enthusiasm" for review of such cases.99 He suggests that
recent cases upholding New York Timesl°° are "mere genuflections as
each year the Court moves farther away from the broad holdings" of
that landmark case.'' Likewise, he asserts that the Court has drawn
94. Id. at 571.
95. Id. at 571-72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 565-566 (1977));
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
96. Id. at 572. Subjective appreciation of falsity or recklessness refers to the New
York Times actual malice standard. See 376 U.S. at 279-80.
97. Id. at 572. The opinion states that the standard of independent judicial review has
become less stringent than that which was first enunciated in New York Times.
98. Id. at 572.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 572 n.17 (citing Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Ill S. Ct. 2419 (1991);
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1986)).
101. Id. at 572.
15
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narrow holdings in all of its recent libel cases,' 12 and denied peti-
tions for certiorari in twenty similar cases.
103
Next, Justice Neely supports the proposition that the United States
Supreme Court's position has changed by pointing to the United States
Supreme Court's endorsement of a "'clearly erroneous' standard for
reviewing jury findings of fact,'1° and recognition that egregious de-
viation from accepted journalistic standards and ill will toward the vic-
tim are admissible circumstantial evidence of actual malice."' 0 5
Therefore, the use of circumstantial evidence may now be used to
prove that a publisher had actual malice when he published the defam-
atory piece. 106 Such circumstantial evidence may include not only the
deviation from journalistic norms, but also "partisanship, ill will toward
the subject of a libel and other 'malicious' motives."'0 7
The majority next offers reasons for the shift in libel law which
makes it "more solicitous of the rights of injured victims."'0 8 Using
an excerpt from a study entitled The Media Elite,10 9 Justice Neely
explains that during the Watergate era, the press enjoyed a golden
period because journalists were perceived to be on the "'right side' of
the critical conflicts of a turbulent age."" 0 However, the public be-
came disenchanted with media negativism and unfairness during the
1980s, perhaps because problems were less easily explained and
solved."' Also, "more sinister, self-serving forces" add to the
public's demand for greater press accountability." 2 The public, Jus-
tice Neely contends, rediscovered that which was temporarily obscured
during the Watergate era: "that the popular media are in the entertain-
ment business far more than they are in the information business.""' 3
102. Id. at 572 n.17 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 572.
104. Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
105. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 573 (citing Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667-68 n.18).
106. Id. at 573.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 574.
109. Id. at 574 n.20 (citing ROBERT LICHTER ET" AL., THE MEDIA ELITE 15-16 (Adler
and Adler 1986)).
110. Id. at 574.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 575.
113. Id. (citing NEIL PosTMAN, AMUsING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN
486 [Vol. 96:471
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Unfortunately, "sensational or 'entertaining' scandal" is necessary for
economic success in the media world, because "mankind has an invet-
erate predilection to rejoice in the suffering and degradation of oth-
ers. 114
Justice Neely acknowledges that stricter libel laws could, however,
jeopardize full, robust debate in our society. Therefore, it is necessary
that courts remain "more solicitous of the media than of any other
class of business defendants in our tort system," by requiring clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice in libel cases."'
In the second section of the Hinerman decision, the majority turns
to the issue of independent judicial review. New York Times requires
that a reviewing court make "an independent evaluation of the facts to
determine whether the jury's verdict was correct and liability can prop-
erly be imposed upon a media defendant." 116 The standard of review
is further defined in Harte-Hanks and requires that the reviewing court
consider the full factual record, "under a clearly erroneous standard
because the trier of fact has had the opportunity to observe the de-
meanor of the witness.""' 7 This means the court must "'examine for
[itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they
were made to see ... whether they are of a character which the prin-
ciples of the First Amendment protect."' 8
Accordingly, the Court undertook a factual review of the record
and determined that:
THE AGE OF SHOW BusINESs (Viking Penguin 1985)).
114. Id. Justice Neely quotes a passage from TENNYSON, IDYLLS OF THE KING, Merlin
and Vivian 135 (New American Library Edition), as illustrative of this proposition. Id.
115. Id. at 575-76. No objective, reasonable person standard applies to public officials
or candidates libel cases. Rather, the media will be held accountable only when subjective
appreciation of falsity or recklessness is shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
576. Justice Neely further explains that media accountability is not dissimilar to judicial
accountability because of the possibility of "chilling effects" in both instances. However, he
differentiates the judiciary from the press because the former is accountable through the
canon of ethics to the public. "This system may not be perfect, but it is better than any-
thing the media have." Id. at 576 n.26 (citing WEST VIRGINIA JUDICIAL CODE OF ETHICS
[1973, as amended]; W. VA. CONST., art. VIII, § 8).
116. Id. at 576.
117. Id. (citing Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688-89).
118. Id.
17
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there was clear and convincing evidence that the writer of the editorial,
Mr. Haught, at the time the editorial was written, either knew that the
impression of dishonesty and unethical conduct that the editorial intention-
ally conveyed was false, or that Mr. Haught published the editorial with
the subjective appreciation that, at least, he was recklessly disregarding the
truth. 1 9
The majority supports the holding by pointing to direct evidence of
subjective appreciation "from Mr. Haught and those who talked with
Mr. Haught soon after the libelous editorial was written.' 20 Like-
wise, he points to "strong circumstantial evidence emerging from gross
deviations from generally accepted standards of journalism[,]" such as
making no effort to contact Mr. Hinerman for a comment before pub-
lishing the editorial.12 Additionally, Mr. Haught's testimony indicat-
ed that he had misgivings about the editorial, and the record supported
a jury inference that the Gazette's publisher, Mr. Chilton, who "bore
strong animus toward lawyers in general," explicitly directed that the
editorial be written despite Mr. Haught's misgivings.122
As a final step in factual evaluation, Justice Neely points to the
original Levin-Gold petition filed with the West Virginia Supreme
Court. 123 The editorial neglected to include that portion of the peti-
tion which complained that one hundred percent of Mr. Levin's bene-
fits would go to Mr. Hinerman until twenty percent of the benefits
already awarded, plus costs, were paid to the lawyer, and that only
119. Id.
120. Id. Apparently, Justice Neely is referring to Mr. Haught's direct examination dur-
ing the trial, at which time he said that he had conversations with Mr. Hinerman during a
prior scandal which Haught had investigated. Haught said that as far as he knew, Hinerman
was an honorable and straight-forward man, id. at 570 n.14, and that he had been surprised
at the present allegations. Id. at 570 n.11.
Testimony of Mr. Hinerman's associates concerning their telephone conversations
with Mr. Haught following the publication of the editorial are also alluded to as direct
evidence of Mr. Haught's subjective appreciation: William Fahey's testimony indicated that
Mr. Haught told Fahey in a telephone conversation that Haught "knew of Ray Hinerman,
knew that he wouldn't be involved in that." Id. at 569 n.7. Michael Nogay's testimony was
essentially the same as Mr. Fahey's. Id. at 570 n.10.
121. Id. at 576-77.
122. Id. at 577.
123. Id.
[Vol. 96:471
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after Mr. Hinerman had been paid would Mr. Levin receive any of the
award. 124 Instead, by basing the editorial on the petition's assertion
that "[t]he effect of the ruling is to give the plaintiff, a practicing
attorney, all of petitioner's income while the petitioner, who is totally
disabled, has no source of income whatsoever[,]" the newspaper inten-
tionally avoided the truth. Such intentional avoidance supports the
finding of actual malice essential in a libel action. 125 Further, an ear-
lier Gazette news article included the distinction between twenty per-
cent of benefits already paid and all of Mr. Levin's award. The truth
was, therefore, generally known and available. Consequently, the omis-
sion of those facts is additional circumstantial evidence of actual mal-
ice.126
Part three of the majority opinion considers the Gazette's argument
on appeal that the paper is immune from liability through qualified
privilege, even though the editorial was false and defamatory. 7 The
Gazette asserted two privileges: the privilege of fair comment and the
privilege to report official proceedings or public meetings.
28
The West Virginia Supreme Court has recognized the privilege of
fair comment12 9  which protects editorial comment.130  Because
"sharp, vituperative and biting criticism are at the heart of free de-
bate," the court will protect opinion unless it "implies undisclosed
defamatory facts."'' Justice Neely offers an example that if the edi-
torial had simply stated the writer's opinion that "all lawyers are low-
life and Mr. Hinerman, by membership in the legal profession, must
on that account be low-life as well, the editorial would be privileged
as fair comment."' 32 Likewise, the privilege to report official pro-
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Dixon v. Ogden, 416 S.E.2d 237, 238 (W. Va. 1991) ("Evidence that a
media defendant intentionally avoided the truth in its investigatory techniques or omitted
facts in order to distort the truth may support a finding of actual malice necessary to sus-
tain an action for libel.").
126. Id. at 577.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 577-78. See discussion supra part II.B.
129. Id. at 577 (citing Havalunch v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1981)).
130. Id. (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)).
131. Id. (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1986)).
132. Id. at 577.
489
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ceedings or public meetings would have applied in this case if the
editorial had simply stated, or fairly abridged, the allegations set out in
the Levin petition because this privilege applies only "if the report is
accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence report-
ed." 133
However, in this instance, the majority suggests that the Gazette
mistakenly attempted to mix the two privileges. A reader of an article
reporting a court pleading is at least on notice that the allegations are
one-sided. Likewise, a reader of a derogatory editorial, which does not
allege or imply supporting facts, is on notice that the editorial is mere-
ly the writer's opinion. A problem arises, however, when the two are
combined because "the reader is led to believe that the editorial writer
has access to undisclosed defamatory facts that lead him to believe the
allegations he is reporting from the court proceeding are correct[.]"' 134
Justice Neely concludes that the privileges do not apply because the
editorial "made additions of its own to what would otherwise be a
privileged report of a court proceeding that conveyed a defamatory
impression, imputed corrupt motives to the plaintiff, and indicted the
integrity of the plaintiff."1 35 The combination of allegations from a
court proceeding and editorial opinion, then, afford the editorial neither
the protection of the fair report privilege nor the fair comment privi-
lege.136
Next, the majority opinion turns to the issue of punitive damages,
embracing the "offer of fair settlement" criterion of Games v. Fleming
Landfill,137 and the reasonable relationship criterion of 7XO Produc-
tion Corp. v. Alliance Resouces138 The Gazette argued that the puni-
tive award of $300,000 should be struck because of its chilling effect
upon First Amendment rights. 3 9 However, the court holds that "[ri]o
133. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977)).
134. Id. at 577.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 577.
137. Id. at 578, 582 (citing Fleming Landfill v. Games, 418 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va.
1991)).
138. Id. at 582 (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources, Corp., 419 S.E.2d
870 (W. Va. 1992)).
139. Id. at 578.
[Vol. 96:471
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case could be stronger for punitive damages" in light of the facts that
(1) the case was tried on the public official theory requiring clear and
convincing proof of actual malice and (2) the Gazette offered no re-
traction, apology, or offer to amend for its defamatory statement.140
The sub-issue of retraction, then, is analyzed in light of the cur-
rent law and public policy concerning media defendants and First
Amendment rights in the hopes of resolving the tension among: "(1)
the public's demand for accountability; (2) the surpassing arrogance of
the media; and, (3) the courts' justified concerns that punitive damages
will lead to excessive self-censorship.' 41
In Games, the court held that one factor used in determining the
excessiveness of punitive damages is whether the defendant made a
timely offer of compensation once liability became clear to the defen-
dant.142 This criterion is justified because in addition to the substan-
tial privileges accorded to the media, the court is also "entitled to im-
pose corresponding obligations, [such as an apology or an attempt to
make amends once liability is clear,] when the media's fulfillment of
those obligations will not compromise free speech one iota or lead to
self-censorship."' 43 A media defendant who meets this obligation
would be entitled "to ask to be treated differently for the purposes of
punitive damages from the media defendant who persists in allowing
the victim's reputation to suffer,"'144 and may, in fact, be shielded
from punitive damages altogether.' 4 However, if that obligation is
not met by the media defendant, no free speech consideration is impli-
cated and, for the purposes of punitive damages, libel will be treated
no differently than "any other tort matter involving willful injury."'146
140. Id. at 579.
141. Id. at 580. The opinion states that in light of the court's anxiety of a chilling
effect of punitive damages on the press, the court remains "willing to craft special rules
governing punitive damages against media defendants in deference to First Amendment con-
siderations." Id.
142. Id. at 580 (citing Fleming Landfill v. Games, 413 S.E.2d 897, 899 (W. Va.
1991)).
143. Id. at 580.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 580 (citing Games, 413 S.E.2d at 899). The apology and offer of amends
would not, however, shield the defendant from actual damages. Id.
146. Id. at 581. The opinion explains that "'[libel' is the peculiar name given to the
21
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Additionally, the majority considers public policy supporting puni-
tive damage awards against media defendants by looking at the media
as a whole and at the Gazette in particular. First, because local media
are increasingly owned by and answerable to distant national
"McMedia"' 47 corporations, wide-open liability for punitive damages
would likely cause the corporations to impose unreasonably conserva-
tive procedures for their local management, thus producing nothing
more than "AP bear stories, pictures of children eating ice cream
cones on the Fourth of July, and food store advertisements."1 4 To
avoid this chilling effect, it is proper to allow some latitude for human
error when determining punitive damages, because, as Mr. Chilton's
tenure at the Gazette demonstrates, broad local control of a newspaper
can lead to substantial benefit to the community. 149 However, no pro-
tection from punitive damages is applicable where the defendant refus-
es to apologize or make amends for a known mistake.50 The majori-
ty believes that to temper punitive damages in such cases would nur-
ture "arrogance and unaccountability rather than full and robust de-
bate. , 15
1
In light of the law and policy considerations, therefore, the court
held that the punitive damage award was appropriate. The reasonable
products liability law that applies to the media. We have not given the media favored status
over automobile, stepladder and lawn mower manufacturers because we want arrogant, abu-
sive, and irresposible media companies; rather, we have given favored status to the media
because we do not want to chill robust and untrammeled debate about public issues." Id. at
581 & n.34 (emphasis in original) (citing David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censor-
ship, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422, 432 (1975) (noting that "the products liability analogy to media
is limited because of the media's ability to decrease the risk 'by increasing their self-
censorship"')).
147. Id. at 581.
148. Id.
149. Id. The opinion identifies that Mr. Chilton's "editorial policy of strictly scrutiniz-
ing the behavior of lawyers led to one of the towering modem law reforms in this state,
namely the abolition of the old 'commissioners of account' system under which political ap-
pointees received enormous fees for precious little effort in the administration of decedents'
estates." Justice Neely adds that Mr. Chilton's premature-death was a tragedy even to his
detractors and "[a]lthough this is a strange context in which to say it, ave atque vale W.E.
Chilton, HI." Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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obligation of a retraction was not met by the Gazette because it nei-
ther offered an apology nor attempted to make amends "even when it
became abundantly clear to all concerned that a serious injustice had
been done." ' 2 Consequently, the paper is not entitled to "special
treatment not accorded to automobile, step-ladder and lawn mower
manufacturers" in the evaluation of punitive damages. 53
The final portion of the opinion154 is devoted to a review of the
law categorizing plaintiffs in a defamation case.155 The majority fore-
shadowed in Part I of the opinion that Mr. Hinerman is not a public
official, and offers this section as clarification, "[a]though resolution of
this issue is not necessary for decision in this appeal," in case a retrial
becomes necessary.156
First, Mr. Hinerman's status is evaluated using the following cate-
gories: "(1) public officials and candidates for public office; (2) public
figures; and, (3) private individuals."'157 "Public officials" are further
defined as publicly elected officials, 58 or "'those among the hier-
archy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of gov-
152. Id. at 580 (emphasis omitted). A note indicates that the entire matter would prob-
ably have been settled had a prompt retraction been made. Id. at 580 n.32. Furthermore,
because the jury found that the actual malice standard requiring subjective appreciation of
falsity or recklessness was met in this case, even if the Gazette believed that the editorial
was privileged and, thus, not actionable, "what conceivable motive other than surpassing ego
and unbridled arrogance could have prevented the Gazette from making amends through a
prompt, prominent and abject apology? In the long run, law and morality are not separate
spheres." Id. at 579 n.30.
153. Id. at 581 (emphasis omitted). In fact, the opinion adds that the Gazette not only
refused to apologize, but "[i]f anything, the follow-up editorial quoted earlier that allegedly
gave the matter 'another look' actually added insult to injury." Id. at 580.
154. Part V of the opinion dealt primarily with the Gazette's assignments of error
dealing with jury instructions and other procedural issues. Justice Neely found each to be
without merit.
155. Id. at 582. This is an issue because the plaintiff in this case cross-assigns error to
the circuit court's determination that Mr. Hinerman is a "public official." Id.
156. Id. at 582. The question of a retrial is now moot, since petition for writ of cer-
tiorari was denied, 113 S. Ct. 1384 (1993).
157. Id. at 582-83 (citing Gertz v. Welsh, 418 U.S. 254 (1974)).
158. Id. at 583 (citing Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1986)).
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ernmental affairs."" 59 Under the first test, none of the three posi-
tions 60 held by Mr. Hinerman are publicly elected posts. Likewise,
Mr. Hinerman's positions fail the "substantial responsibility or control"
test. Although the Gazette argued that as a member of the Board of
Governors of the West Virginia State Bar Mr. Hinerman did meet this
criterion, the court finds that the Board merely advises the Supreme
Court. As a second vice-president of an advisory board Hinerman did
not exert substantial responsibility or control over governmental af-
fairs. 61 Further, even if Mr. Hinerman were a public official, he
would not have been treated as such in this case because the Gazette
editorial failed to identify him as a public official. 62 Citing a Second
Circuit case and other persuasive support, 163 the majority explains
that in order to raise the public official doctrine of actual malice, a
media defendant must identify a low-level government official in his
public capacity. 64 Applying this rule to the case at hand, then, Mr.
Hinerman is treated as a private individual rather than a public official
because the Gazette identified him only as a lawyer and a UMW
attorney. In the event of a retrial, therefore, the private individual
negligence standard would apply, rather than the actual, malice standard
which applies to public officials. 65
159. Id. at 582 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966)).
160. Mr. Hinerman held three positions pointed to by the Gazette as indicative of
"public official" status: he was (1) appointed municipal judge, (2) appointed member of the
racing commission, and, (3) elected to the Board of Governors of the West Virginia State
Bar. Only the latter was an elected position, and this post fails to meet the additional re-
quirement of being elected by the public, because lawyers, not the public, elected him. Id.
at 582-83.
161. Id. at 583. As support for this position, Neely points to Gertz v. Welsh, 418 U.S.
254 (where the court failed to find a lawyer and member of the National Lawyer's Guild
to be a public official) and Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1031 (1981) (where the court failed to find public figure status although the individual
had served on Vice-President Agnew's staff, was a deputy director of administration on the
President's reelection committee, and was a "'special assistant to the Assistant Administrator
of the General Services Administration"'). Id.
162. Id. at 583.
163. Id. at 583-84.
164. Id. at 583. It is not necessary, however, "to identify a president, governor, U.S.
senator, congressman, or other well-known public official as serving in a particular office."
Id.
165. Id. at 584.
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B. The Dissent: A "Badly Bothched" Case
Justice Miller's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Brotherton,
concludes that as a matter of law the plaintiff failed to prove the falsi-
ty of the Gazette editorial because the editorial was an accurate report
of official proceedings.166 In addition, the colorful opinion attacks
Justice Neely's majority opinion with vigor:
In my more than thirty-five years as a trial lawyer and as a Judge on
this Court, I have never seen a major case so badly botched. It contains a
virtual Augean stables' worth of error and surplusage .... 6
I cannot help but note the majority's wolf-in-sheep's-clothing patron-
izing of the press. It assures the Gazette of its high regard, while simulta-
neously battering the paper with various low blows supplied by the most
implacable media critics. Were it not for judicial immunity, I suspect the
Gazette would have a good libel suit against the majority .... 168
It is unfortunate that the majority is unwilling to faithfully apply First
Amendment law, sworn as we are as judges to uphold the Constitution of
the United States.1 69
Miller explains that the majority opinion: (1) fails to compare the
original and unchallenged Gazette article with the editorial to deter-
mine "substantial inaccuracy"; (2) fails to address the controlling issue
of whether or not the Gazette was privileged against the libel suit
because of the right of the press to fairly and accurately report official
proceedings; (3) "must manufacture legal authority to reach its stun-
ning conclusion that the current United States Supreme Court has a
diminished interest in media libel cases"; and, (4) errs in its evaluation
of the role of a retraction in a libel case.170
166. Id. at 594 (Miller, J. dissenting).
167. Id. at 583 (quoting BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 118 (Modem Library Edition) (refer-
ring to Hercules' task of cleaning the King's three thousand oxen's stalls, which had not
been cleaned for thirty years)). This is the first of Justice Miller's literary allusions in the
opinion, perhaps mocking the majority writer's penchant for quoting classical literature in
his own opinions.
168. Id. at 585.
169. Id. at 596.
170. Id. at 584-85.
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Miller turns first to the facts of the case and determines that the
threshold requirement of falsity is not established. A Gazette article,
which was not challenged as false, reported the contents of Mr.
Levin's petition filed in the Supreme Court. 7' The editorial in ques-
tion was, in turn, based on that earlier article. The editorial must be
evaluated, then, as to whether it accurately summarized the article
upon which it was based. The allegedly libelous elements in the edito-
rial were (1) its statement that Mr. Levin contended that "'his lawyer
took every penny, getting $12,000 for one day's work"'; and (2) its
failure to include the phrase "'until the [fee] bill was paid."",17 2 Nev-
ertheless, the dissent finds the "gist or 'sting"' of the editorial accu-
rate: Mr. Hinerman charged Mr. Levin a fee of over $12,000 for one
day's work and when Mr. Levin did not properly answer the fee suit,
the default judgment allowed Mr. Hinerman to seize all of Mr. Levin's
benefits. Therefore, "from Levin's viewpoint, he was not receiving a
single penny of his workers' compensation benefits because every
penny was going to the lawyer.' ' 173 Although the editorial did not
reveal whether the $12,000 judgment would absorb the entire award,
the dissent insists that the majority unreasonably requires the journalist
to make this complicated legal calculation. 174
The dissent reviews constitutional libel law'75 and determines
that, up until the Hinerman majority opinion, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court had faithfully followed the constitutional precepts which
require that a plaintiff in a public official libel case must prove by
clear and convincing evidence (1) that the statements were "false or
misleading to the extent that the true facts would have produced a
'different effect on the mind of the reader' because '[m]inor inaccura-
cies do not amount to falsity so long as 'the gist, the sting, of the
libelous charge be justified;"" 76 (2) that the statement defamed the
171. Id. The May 18, 1983 article is set out in its entirety by Justice Miller. However,
he maintains that the majority refuses to do this because "the article demonstrates the sub-
stantial accuracy of the editorial." Id. at 586 n.8.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 586-88.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 587-90.
176. Id. at 590 (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419
496 (Vol. 96:471
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plaintiff; (3) that the statements were published with knowledge of fal-
sity or with reckless and willful disregard of the truth; and, (4) that
"the publisher intended to injure the plaintiff through the knowing or
reckless publication of the alleged libelous material. ' 177 Furthermore,
knowledge of falsity or recklessness must be determined at the time of
publication.178 Therefore, the dissent suggests that the majority inac-
curately imputes actual malice to Mr. Haught at the time of publica-
tion by using evidence17 9 that occurred only after the publication of
the editorial. 80 Further, the majority inaccurately supports the same
proposition with evidence that Mr. Chilton had a bias against lawyers.
Justice Miller contends that this evidence is equally not supportive be-
cause "ill will is not equivalent to actual malice [and] 'should not be
confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive
arising from spite or ill will.
'
"
181
The dissent further asserts that the majority misinterprets the privi-
lege to fairly and accurately report official proceedings, and objects to
the mere three paragraphs the majority opinion devotes to this essential
issue.1 82 The right of the press to report with impunity any public
proceeding has been consistently upheld nationally, 183 and was em-
braced most recently by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Dixon v.
Ogden Newspapers.8 4 The dissent contends that the majority ignores
(1991) (citations omitted in original)).
177. Id. at 590 (citing Dixon, 416 S.E.2d at 238).
178. Id.
179. The dissent refers to the majority's use of the evidence of Mr. Haught's telephone
conversations with Mr. Hinerman's associates. Id. at 567-70 nn.2-16.
180. Id. at 590.
181. Id. (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419).
182. Id. at 590 & n.14. The dissent further criticizes the majority for overlooking all
First Amendment cases, and instead citing only the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. In
another literary allusion, Justice Miller advises:
In this unbridled ignorance, the majority writer, a devotee of Tennyson's Idylls of
the King, "Merlin and Vivian," might take heed of this thought from the same
work by Tennyson: 'Blind and naked ignorance delivers brawling judgments un-
ashamed, on all things all day long.'
Id. at 590.
183. Id. at 590-92.
184. Id. at 592 (citing Dixon v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 237 (W. Va.
1991)).
497
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Dixon, where the court unanimously found that a newspaper article,
reporting from a trial that police officers may have leaked confidential
information about a police raid, was substantially accurate and,
therefore, not libelous. 85 Applying this law to the case at hand, the
dissent argues that the original Gazette news article was a fair and
accurate rendition of the Levin petition to the Supreme Court, and the
editorial's only omission was that the attachment would continue "'on-
ly until the [fee] bill was paid."' Without the phrase, the editorial is
substantially accurate because Mr. Levin would not receive any money
until the lawyer was paid. There was no way for a reporter or editorial
writer to evaluate if the award would even be large enough to cover
the bill because only one well-versed in the law could make such an
evaluation. More importantly, the dissent points to the fact that "the
real harm was that the attachment took all of Mr. Levin's source of
funds. He was impoverished and without any income." '86 Omitting
"until the fee was paid," then, was not a material omission with de-
famatory implication. In fact, the addition of the phrase would add
nothing because it is a matter of common understanding that one could
not collect more than the amount owed. The Gazette's editorial, there-
fore, was substantially accurate when viewed in reference to the privi-
lege to report official proceedings.1
8 7
Further, the dissent rejects the majority's analysis of First Amend-
ment cases, and specifically, the "dubious assertion that the current
membership of the United States Supreme Court has a 'waning enthu-
siasm for reviewing liable [sic] judgments against media defen-
dants."" 88 The list of twenty denials for certiorari in libel cases dem-
onstrates "the shallowness of the majority's research," considering only
one of the cases listed had involved a monetary judgment against a
media defendant. 89 The dissent points to recent cases as contradicto-
ry of the majority's retreat theory. 190 The majority, in fact, rests its
185. Id. at 592.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 592-93 (citing Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 592).
189. Id. at 592-3 & nn.16-17.
190. Id. at 592-93 (citing Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657 (1989); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Masson v. New Yorker
[Vol. 96:471
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conclusion on such impermissible standards as the Gazette's supposed
duty to call Mr. Hinerman in advance of publishing the editorial,' 91
and disregards the high court's latest statement that minor inaccuracies
that do not alter the thrust of asserted libel do not amount to falsi-
ty.192 Had the majority heeded these precepts, Justice Miller con-
cludes, the Gazette editorial would have properly been found not li-
belous because there was no proof of falsity in light of the fair and
accurate reporting privilege.
193
The dissent also objects to the majority's suggestion that the fail-
ure of the Gazette to offer a retraction is conclusive proof of actual
malice because this suggestion is contrary to the general rule that
actual malice is determined at the time of publication.'9 4 Although
some cases have held that the failure to retract may be used as evi-
dence on the issue of actual malice, 95 New York Times established
that failure to retract, in and of itself, is insufficient to establish actual
malice. 196 Such a failure may, in fact, represent the publisher's good
faith belief that no defamation had occurred. 197 A prompt retraction
may, however, be used as evidence of a lack of actual malice198 and
Magazine, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2419 (1991)).
191. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 593 (Miller, J. dissenting). Miller stresses the following
language: "[F]ailure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person
would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard." Id. (citing Harte-
Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688 (1989).
192. Id. at 594 (citing Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419
(1991)).
193. Id. at 594.
194. Id. at 594-95 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 594 (citing Golden Bear Distrib. Sys. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944
(5th Cir. 1983); Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr.
206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
580A, comment d (1977)).
196. Id. at 594 (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 586).
197. Id. at 594-95. This 9tatement may be in response to Justice Neely's query in foot-
note 30 of the majority opinion: "Assuming that the Gazette believed that its statements
were privileged and thus not actionable in a court of law, what conceivable motive other
than surpassing ego and unbridled arrogance could have prevented . . . a prompt, prominent,
abject apology?" Id. at 579 n.30.
198. Id. at 595 (citing Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.
1987); Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1977), atf'd, 578 F.2d
442 (1978); Sweaney v. United Loan & Fin. Co., 468 P.2d 124 (Ka. 1970)).
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may also be used to mitigate damages.' 99 In fact, Justice Miller con-
tends that a good faith retraction should totally "insulate a media de-
fendant from a punitive damage award. ' 200
The dissent further criticizes the majority's obiter dictum conclu-
sion that Mr. Hinerman was a private, rather than public person. How-
ever, even assuming this to be true, Mr. Hinerman would still fail in
his libel action because he failed to prove falsity.20' According to
Miller, then, because no such falsity has been proven, even under the
negligence standard applied to private citizens, Hinerman's judgment
cannot be sustained.
In conclusion, the dissent invites United States Supreme Court
review of this case because it exposes West Virginia's media to the
majority's "pernicious reasoning. 20 2 In a final literary allusion, he
warns the West Virginia press: "Never send to know for whom the
bell tolls; it tolls for thee."20 3
V. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court denied the Gazette's petition for
writ of certiorai, which leaves us with the prospect of evaluating
the current state of West Virginia's media libel law in light of the
Hinerman opinion.
At first blush, it is obvious that the Hinerman majority offers
substantial rhetorical ammunition to West Virginia plaintiffs in future
media libel cases. What self-respecting plaintiffs attorney would fore-
go the opportunity to reiterate Justice Neely's words to argue that it
was only because of "surpassing ego and unbridled ignorance" that a
199. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (1923) (providing that an apology is evidence
in mitigating damages)).
200. Id. at 595.
201. Id. at 595 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)
(requiring that a private person prove falsity, as well as fault); and Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at
2704)).
202. Id. at 596.
203. Id. at 596 (quoting JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS Medi-
tation XVII).
204. 113 S. Ct. 1384.
[Vol. 96:471
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media defendant had refused the plaintiff a retraction? 2 5 Likewise,
the policy of deterring "arrogant, abusive, and irresponsible media
companies" will be stressed by plaintiffs in future libel litigation. 6
Substantively, several aspects of the majority's holding in
Hinerman are likely to effect the libel law of this state as well. The
majority interprets a "less stringent" New York Times appellate review
standard,0 7 a "waning enthusiasm" on the part of the United States
Supreme Court to review libel judgments,0 8 and narrowly drawn Su-
preme Court libel holdings209 as indicative of an anti-irresponsible
media policy on the part of the Court. The majority reasons that this
policy supports the necessity of the Hinerman pro-victim approach.
However, as Justice Miller convincingly asserts, the myriad of
libel cases which have been denied certiorari are far from proof that
the United States Supreme Court has lost enthusiasm for libel is-
sues.210 In fact, it is inappropriate to interpret the denial of a writ as
any indication of policy considering the volume of petitions the Su-
preme Court receives each year in comparison to the number of cases
the Supreme Court can realistically hear. Likewise, the Supreme Court
has admonished that such a denial "imports no expression upon the
merits of the case.,
211
Furthermore, narrow holdings in recent Supreme Court libel deci-
sions do not necessarily indicate "an ebbing tolerance for irresponsible
media behavior. '212 Of the six cases cited to support this proposition,
three of the holdings were in favor of the defendant,21 3 and three
were in favor of the plaintiff.214 It would appear, therefore, that nar-
205. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 579 n.30.
206. Id. at 581 (Miller, J. dissenting).
207. Id. at 572.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 572 n.17.
210. Id. at 593 (Miller, J. dissenting).
211. United States v. Carter, 260 U.S. 483, 490 (1923).
212. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 572 & n.17.
213. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
214. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991); Harte-Hanks Com-
munication, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
31
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row holdings which apply equally to victorious plaintiffs and victorious
defendants would not support an anti-press attitude. Rather, this would
seem to reflect a concern to address only the case and controversy at
issue in each case.
The majority suggests that the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist
indicate a shift in the majority position on defamation issues. In opin-
ions in 1984, 1985, and 1986,215 Jusice Rehnquist dissented in def-
amation cases.216 However, in 1988 and 1990,217 Justice Rehnquist
wrote majority defamation opinions. According to the Hinerman
majority's analysis, this shift "may signal that the majority has moved
sufficiently to accommodate the concerns of at least one of the dissent-
ers. 218 However, a review of these cases does not necessarily lead
to that conclusion.
Of the three dissenting opinions cited, two were authored by Jus-
tice Rehnquist. In the 1984 Bose v. Consumer Union case, Rehnquist
based his dissent on a procedural issue.219 In that case the majority
held that actual malice in libel cases must be factually reevaluated by
the appellate court in order to determine whether the evidence support-
ed the conclusion reached by the lower court with convincing clari-
ty.22o Justice Rehnquist's dissent reasoned that actual malice involves
a mens rea judgment.221 Trial courts hear and see the witnesses,
know the law involved, and are more fully equipped than an appellate
court, with only a bare record in front of it, to make mens rea judg-
ments.222 Consequently, he advocated adopting the normal "clearly
erroneous" standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 223 Jus-
tice Renquist's opinion is based more on the policy of deference to the
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
215. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1985); Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
216. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 573-74 n.19.
217. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 449 U.S. 966 (1990); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
218. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 574 n.19.
219. 466 U.S. at 515.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a).
[Vol. 96:471
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factual determinations of lower courts than on a rejection of the
majority's assessment of First Amendment principles.224
Likewise, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Rehnquist dissented on
similar procedural grounds. The majority held in that case that a court
considering a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in a libel case must apply the clear and
convincing standard which is normally applied to the fact-finder in
such a case. Justice Rehnquist's objection to the majority holding was
that by creating a different procedural standard from that which is
traditionally used, libel decisions will become less predictable.225 In
offering no guidance as to how to apply this new standard, Rehnquist
feared that the majority's position would lead to erratic lower court
decisions on summary judgment in libel cases.226  Again, the
Rehnquist dissent is not based on any First Amendment concern, but
rather on a concern for procedural consistency.
Rehnquist and two other justices joined Justice Steven's substan-
tive Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps dissent.2 7 In Hepps, a private
figure businessman alleged he was defamed by a publication which
inferred that he had used links to organized crime to influence legisla-
tive and administrative processes. The majority held that constitutional-
ly, in a private individual/public matter case, the burden of proving
falsity and fault must be borne by the plaintiff.228 The dissent urged
that the majority result places too heavy a burden on victims and
virtually insures their inability to disprove negligently false publica-
tions.229 Although Rehnquist joined this clearly pro-victim dissent,
this case did not directly involve the New York Times actual malice
standard because no public official or figure was involved. Therefore,
his opinion here is not analogous to his next libel majority opinion
which did involve the actual malice standard. 30
224. Bose, 466 U.S. at 515.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 475 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
228. Id. at 768.
229. Id. at 781-82.
230. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46.
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In fact, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the Chief Justice expand-
ed the New York Times standard.23' The case involved an advertising
parody of "first times," which depicted Jerry Falwell, a nationally-
known minister and political figure, in a drunken and incestuous man-
ner.232 Falwell alleged, among other things,233 that the publication
entitled him to recover for damages for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.234 The jury ruled for Falwell on this issue and
awarded him $100,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive dam-
ages. 235 The Supreme Court, however, overturned the judgment and
held that when First Amendment freedoms are implicated, the actual
malice standard will apply not only to reputational injury alleged by
public officials, but to intentional infliction of emotional distress as
well.236 By applying the New York Times standard to a tort, the Su-
preme Court showed a willingness to expand, rather than limit, the
doctrine.
The Hinennan majority finds it ironic that in Hustler Rehnquist
quotes from the Bose majority opinion, from which he had dissent-
ed.237 Justice Rehnquist does, in fact, reiterate the Bose policy of
protecting a free society by ensuring an unhampered exchange of ideas
on matters of public concern.238 However, as discussed earlier,
Rehnquist's dissent in Bose was based on a procedural matter, and his
reiteration in Hustler of the policies espoused by the Bose majority
would seem to affirmn a commitment to the New York Times doctrine,
rather than signal that the majority has shifted to accommodate earlier
libel dissenters, as the Hinerman majority opinion suggests.239
231. Id. at 47.
232. Id. at 474.8.
233. Falwell sued for libel and invasion of privacy as well. The jury found that no
libel had occurred because the advertisement could not "reasonably be understood as de-
scribing actual facts . . . or actual events in which [he] participated." The United States
Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 46. The District Court directed a verdict against Falwell on
the invasion of privacy claim. Id.
234. Id. at 46.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 573-74 n.19.
238. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50-51.
239. See Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 774 n.19.
[Vol. 96:471
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Justice Rehnquist's most recent libel majority opinion, Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal, concerned a private individual and held that no addi-
tional constitutional privilege for "opinion" need be established in light
of the protection already afforded freedom of expression by the First
Amendment. 240 His opinion did recognize society's important interest
in protecting individual reputation.24' However, the decision may re-
flect an unwillingness to further constitutionalize libel law. Justice
Rehnquist's Bose and Anderson dissents show the Justice's concern
that libel cases now present procedurally complicated matters for trial
courts, possibly resulting in erratic decisions. Adding further constitu-
tional requirements to an already procedurally complicated issue would
undoubtedly add to the confusion.
Justice Neely's hypothesis, therefore, that recent Supreme Court
libel decisions approving of New York Times v. Sullivan are "mere
genuflections as each year the Court moves farther away" from New
York Times principles242 appears to be ill-founded. As illustrated, the
United States Supreme Court appears ready to protect the First
Amendment freedoms of expression with a vigor at least equal to that
which it had in 1964 when New York Times was decided. Regardless,
the West Virginia Supreme Court majority in Hinerman has formally
adopted the idea that the United States Supreme Court now has less
enthusiasm for protecting the First Amendment guarantees afforded the
press. The obvious implication of this policy is that media defendants
who find themselves in front of the state's high court are likely to
encounter a more hostile environment than that of the past.
Part VI of the Hinerman majority, dealing with the public/private
243 1tatfigure doctrine, reveals that the Court is more likely to find a bor-
der-line case in favor of plaintiffs. This is consistent with the pro-
victim policy which underlies the majority opinion. Mr. Hinerman held
three positions: (1) municipal judge; (2) member of the West Virginia
Racing Commission; and (3) West Virginia State Bar Vice-Presi-
240. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
241. Id. at 13-18.
242. Hinennan, 423 S.E.2d at 572 n.17 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254; Gertz v. Robert Welch Co., 418 U.S. 323)).
243. Id. at 582-84.
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dent.244 The majority found that none of these positions qualified Mr.
Hinerman as a public official, 245 and even if the positions alone had
qualified, because he was not identified in that position in the editorial,
the public official doctrine did not apply in this case. 246 By applying
this latter requirement which comes from persuasive authority,247 the
Court has shown its hesitance to apply the public official doctrine in
close cases.
This being the case, West Virginia media defendants must take
several precautions. First, any public employee, low-level governmental
or quasi-governmental official who is not publicly elected should be
identified in that position.248 If not, the plaintiff will argue that under
Hinennan, by definition, he is not a public official, and must meet
only a burden of proving negligence in the publication of a defamatory
falsity, rather that the stiffer burden of actual malice. Secondly, even if
the plaintiff is identified in that position, unless he or she clearly has
"substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of govern-
mental affairs"249 the Court is unlikely to find public official status.
Consequently, the media defendant in West Virginia can anticipate less
favorable treatment in the determination of public official status than
can the plaintiff.
A final major disagreement in the Hinerman opinions appears to
rest on the predicate issue of substantial falsity, and the proper stan-
dard of review to be applied to falsity. Both camps agree that a re-
viewing court is required to independently evaluate the facts of a libel
case and determine whether the jury's verdict was correct and liability
was properly imposed. However, the disagreement involves the method
of that review.
244. Id. at 582-83.
245. Id. at 583.
246. Id. (citing Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1111 (1983)).
247. Id. at 583.
248. Id.
249. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335 n.6 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85
(1966)).
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The majority asserts that in determining whether the constitutional
actual malice standard has been met, the entire factual record should
be evaluated under the clearly erroneous standard.250 The dissent urg-
es that before reaching the actual malice question, the entire record
must be evaluated, in light of the privileges asserted, to determine if
falsity exists. 25' The dissent in this case found no clear and convinc-
ing evidence of falsity, and under its criterion of review, the case fails
the threshold question in an independent evaluation. The Gazette's
Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
complained that the Hinerman majority has indicated its belief that it
is not required to conduct an independent evaluation of the substantial
falsity issue in defamation cases by accepting the Hinerman jury's
determination of falsity without substantial analysis.252 Courts are
split on the standard of appelate review of falsity, and the Supreme
Court has not yet clarified the matter.
Underlying the court's disagreement about appellate review is the
issue of ensuring that a jury has fully appreciated the significance of
First Amendment protection in rendering their verdict. Certainly, sym-
pathetic juries may err at any step of the complicated process which
has become the complex current state of the defamation trial. One U.S.
District Judge provided a strategy to be employed at the trial level to
ensure less jury confusion.253 In the 1984 Sharon v. Time Magazine
case, the jury was asked to consider the three issues of defamation,
falsity, and actual malice separately.2 54 The jury found first that the
publication was, in fact, defamatory.255 Then, it found that it was,
likewise, false.256 However, on the last issue the jury found that the
plaintiff had not shown that the defendant had published the article
250. Id. at 561.
251. Id. at 587-92 (Miller, J. dissenting).
252. Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court at
14, Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1384 (1993).
253. Ronald Dworkin, The Press on Trial-Reckless Disregard: Westmorland v. CBS et
al.; Sharon v. Time Magazine By Renata Adler, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Feb. 26, 1987,
at 27. See also Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
254. Id. at 29.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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with actual malice.1 7 Such a strategy seems eminently sensible. The
process is simplified for the jury and a defamed public official may
have the moral satisfaction of favorable defamation and falsity verdicts,
even if he is unable to prove actual malice on the part of the media.
Likewise, the media defendant would probably be less likely to have
large adverse verdicts. A sympathetic jury could vindicate a plaintiff,
at least on the falsity and defamation issues, without finding actual
malice. Therefore, the jury may be more receptive to defense argu-
ments on the chilling effect of large plaintiff awards in close actual
malice cases. The effect, then, would be a win-win situation for mor-
ally vindicated plaintiffs and defendants who are not monetarily in-
jured. The obvious procedural advantage is that a local jury is less
likely to be influenced by their feelings and more able to apply the
law and constitutional safeguards effectively.
In the absence of such a universal procedure, however, it appears
logically necessary for appellate courts to scrutinize each level of a
defamation case independently, using the convincing clarity standard.
However, the United States Supreme Court has specifically declined to
give guidance on the matter, 58 and the West Virginia Supreme Court
does not appear anxious to reevaluate the evidence of falsity in de-
tai259 to "assure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden
intrusion on the field of free expression., 260 Consequently, future
West Virginia media defendants are likely to have few verdicts over-
turned at the state appellate level on the threshold falsity issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, the essential lesson of Hinennan is that
media defendants will be less sheltered in West Virginia courts than
they have been in the past. The clear message is that the First Amend-
ment protection upon which they have steadfastly relied may not be
enough to escape future libel verdicts. The majority writer minces no
257. Id.
258. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 661 n.2.
259. See Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 585 (Miller, J. dissenting).
260. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285.
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words in his disdain of media arrogance and his willingness to protect
libel victims. Whether the decision will have an actual chilling effect
on West Virginia's media remains to be seen. One might predict that
lawyers will advise their media defendants to be vigilant in policing
their ranks, to take no chances if the facts are not crystal clear, and to
try to avoid potential punitive damages by offering timely, unequivocal
retractions.
The media may, however, take solace in the fact that Hinerman
was essentially a two-to-two decision by the current court, because
Justice McHugh did not participate in the decision.261 Depending on
that Justice's proclivity, the next media defendant before the West
Virginia Supreme Court may meet with a more sympathetic judicial
environment.
Carole Lewis Bloom
261. Senior Justice Caplan joined Justices Neely and Workman to form the majority.
See supra note 90.
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